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I. INTRODUCTION
The experience of the United States and Latin America in cop-
ing with internal conflict certainly provides fertile ground for the
student of dilemmas in international law. One that is of central
importance derives from the fact that strict adherence to the prin-
ciple of non-intervention and the international legal norms prohib-
iting the use of force may permit the consolidation and mainte-
nance in power of regimes that one finds hard to accept, either
because of their brutal repression and gross violations of funda-
mental human rights, or because they adopt a Marxist orientation
which links them with the Soviet Union and other communist
states. It is useful to maintain the distinction between these two
types of "undesirable regimes" in order to highlight the different
reasons we may find them undesirable, although it is certainly true
that in a given case a Marxist regime may also engage in repression
and the violation of fundamental human rights such as the rights
to life, physical integrity of the person, and freedom from arbitrary
detention.' Moreover, it is evident that different people find re-
gimes repugnant for different reasons, as a close examination of
attitudes toward Argentina from 1976 to 1980, and toward Nicara-
gua after July 1979, reveals.2
There is, therefore, an inherent tension between the interna-
tional legal norms prohibiting intervention and the use of force, on
the one hand, and the desire to have regimes which do not violate
fundamental human rights or which are not Marxist, on the other.
How is this dilemma to be resolved?
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Associate Professor of Law,
University of Alabama.
I On the OAS human rights system, see generally T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D.
SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS (1982). On
human rights in general, see R. LILuacH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1979); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).
See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at
34, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5-29 (H. Wiarda ed.) (1982).
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As international lawyers, I would submit, we should look first to
existing international law for guidance. There we find no legal pro-
hibition against a regime adopting a Marxist orientation,3 and that
all governments are bound under customary international law to
respect the fundamental human rights mentioned above.4 While
certain writers might disagree, 5 most states have taken the view
that the prohibition against the use of force does not give way to a
unilateral right of armed intervention to bring human rights
abuses to an end." Under international law, therefore, primacy is
given to the prohibition against the use of force. Nonetheless, it is
equally true that states may, and should, do everything within
their power to strengthen the international legal machinery
designed to guarantee the observance of human rights. In addition,
states are legally free to take a variety of unilateral measures
aimed at securing the observance of human rights by a given re-
gime. These measures, however, do not include the use of force.7
A second dilemma results from the fact that while the interna-
tional use of force and the protection of human rights are domains
of action which are strictly separated by the international legal
norms prohibiting armed intervention, internal strife and the
abuse of human rights are at the same time inextricably entwined,
in a causal sense, with international conflict involving the use of
force. In short, despite the legal separation of these phenomena,
there is often a close relationship between them in fact. We have
seen this in Sarajevo (which was very far from Berlin and London),
in the Spanish Civil War, in Nazi Germany, in Bangladesh, in
3 This proposition is a corollary of the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of
all states. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Friendly Relations]; Charter of the Or-
ganization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, amended by
Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 15, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinaf-
ter cited as OAS Charter]. References in the text to provisions of the OAS Charter are to
the numbers of such articles currently in force under the revised OAS Charter. The reader
should note that former articles 15 and 17 are now articles 18 and 20; that former articles 18
and 19 are now articles 21 and 22; that former articles 39 and 40 are now articles 59 and 60;
and that the principles of former article 5 are now contained in article 3.
" See, e.g., Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTs: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 115-37 (L. Henkin
ed. 1981).
See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
See infra note 18.
See, e.g., A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIvERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 583-84 (1976).
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Uganda, and elsewhere. Most recently, we have seen the internal
politics of Argentina and the shadow of responsibility for its
human rights abuses operating in such a manner as to help spark
the invasion of the Falklands.8 The dangers which result from this
interrelationship are twofold. The first is that internal conflict may
become internationalized, drawing in the major powers or other
outside forces and leading to a major international conflict. The
second is that internal strife may tempt leaders to engage in for-
eign aggression, either to maintain their grip on power or as a kind
of natural sequel to the utter disdain for universal values and in-
ternational law, particularly the international law of human rights,
they may have acquired through their own use of internal repres-
sion. The second dilemma, therefore, is between the need to act to
prevent domestic strife from developing in ways which lead to in-
ternational conflict, and the fact that foreign military intervention
aimed at halting or determining the outcome of civil strife is likely
to lead directly to international conflict-the very evil that is to be
avoided. How, then, is this second dilemma to be resolved?
The answer to this second dilemma, I believe, is also suggested
by international law, and consists in placing a very high priority on
national policies aimed at securing greater implementation of the
international law of human rights. Given the relationship between
internal and international conflict, perhaps the only solutions to
the dilemmas described above are to be found in our active use of
international law and institutions so that they minimize foreign in-
tervention in civil strife, while at the same time strengthening the
demand for accountability that might reduce violations of funda-
mental human rights. The emphasis on human rights and the need
to strengthen international machinery for their protection is ex-
tremely important, not only in terms of the intrinsic value of se-
curing their effective observance, but also in terms of preventing
situations of internal strife from developing to the point where
outside powers are tempted to intervene. While this article does
not focus on the human rights aspects of the solution to these di-
lemmas, addressing instead the legal framework governing foreign
intervention and related action by the Organization of American
States (OAS), the fundamental importance of the former should be
borne in mind.
' See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1982, at 7, col. 5 (first kidnapping and assassination of
the year); N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, § 4, at 2, col. 2; THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON INSIGHT
TEAM, WAR IN THE FALKLANDS 64-65 (1982) (March 30 riots the worst in 6 years).
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Against the background of these introductory remarks, let us
now examine the normative framework relevant to coping with in-
ternal conflicts in the Western hemisphere. The international legal
framework relating to foreign intervention and OAS practice in
this area consists of fundamental norms contained in the United
Nations Charter,e the OAS Charter,10 and the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance," popularly known as the "Rio
Treaty."
A. The United Nations Charter
The cornerstone of the United Nations and the postwar legal or-
der is the prohibition of the use of force contained in article 2,
paragraph 4, of its Charter. That provision, in language which is
worth recalling, establishes the following: "All members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." The Charter provides for three exceptions to this
comprehensive prohibition against the use of force across interna-
tional frontiers. The first is "the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of
the United Nations," established in article 51. The second is action
taken by the Security Council under articles 39-42 (chapter VII) of
the Charter in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Article 41 provides for the adoption of economic sanctions
not involving the use of armed force, while article 42 provides for
the adoption of military sanctions if necessary to enforce the deci-
sions of the Security Council. No measures may be adopted, how-
ever, if one of the Permanent Members of the Council vetoes such
action.
The third exception to the prohibition contained in article 2(4)
is the adoption of measures by a regional agency such as the
OAS."' Article 53(1) provides, however, that: "[N]o enforcement
9 U.N. CHARTER.
,o Supra note 3.
" Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].
" Particularly significant is the question of whether states which are Members of both
the U.N. and the OAS must resort to the latter before taking their complaints to the U.N.
Security Council. Those who argue that such recourse is required build their case on U.N.
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action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council ... .
Several questions have arisen in the past when cases involving re-
gional enforcement action by the OAS have been considered by the
Security Council. Does "authorization" mean prior authorization?
Does enforcement action include economic sanctions such as those
described in article 41, which an individual state would be free to
take acting alone? Is the requirement of Security Council "ap-
proval" satisfied if the Security Council simply fails to disapprove
the regional enforcement action in question (resulting, for example,
from United States exercise of its veto power)? The United States
and many Latin American states have traditionally answered these
questions in a manner which gives the greatest latitude to the
OAS." Given the text of article 53(1), however, great controversy
surrounds each of these questions, and it is not at all clear that the
American view would be upheld, for example, should the question
be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory
opinion." Both the Security Council and the General Assembly are
authorized to request such an opinion.15
Some authorities have argued in support of two additional ex-
ceptions to the prohibition against the use of force contained in
article 2(4). The first is the asserted right of intervention to protect
nationals in danger of imminent harm and to evacuate them from
the country in question. Such intervention has been supported as
an extension of the right of self-defense.1 The second exception is
CHARTER art. 52, para. 2, which provides: "The Members of the United Nations entering
into such [regional] arrangements shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initi-
ative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council." But cf. id. art. 52,
para. 4 (does not impair articles 34 and 35); id. art. 24, para. 1 (Security Council has pri-
mary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security); id. art. 39 (Secur-
ity Council authority under chapter VII).
's See, e.g., M. ETzIONI, MAJORITY OF ONE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF REGIONAL COMPATIIL-
ITY (1970).
1 See, e.g., id. at 190; Jim~nez de Ar6chaga, La coordination des syst~mes de I'ONU et
de 'lOrganisation des Etats Amkricains pour le r~glement pacifique des diff6rends et de la
scuritk collective, 111 RECUKIL DES CouRS 423, 465-82 (1964-I) [hereinafter cited as
Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, La coordination des syst~mes); Jim~nez de Ar6chaga, International
Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECun.L DES COURS 1, 139-42 (1978-I) [hereinafter
cited as Jim~nez de Ar~chaga, International Law]; Akehurst, Enforcement Action By Re-
gional Agencies, With Special Reference to the Organization of American States, 1967
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 175, 185-97, 214-19 (1969).
,6 U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1. Cuba proposed that the Security Council make such a
request in 1962. See, e.g., M. ETzIoNI, supra note 13, at 183-90.
" See, e.g., D. BowTrr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 187-93 (1958); Note,
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an asserted right of humanitarian intervention in order to bring to
a halt fundamental violations of human rights and to protect indi-
viduals of any nationality, including nationals of the target state,
from imminent harm. Humanitarian intervention is justified as not
falling within the general prohibition of article 2(4)."1 Despite the
appeal of these additional exceptions in extraordinary cases, they
are not accepted by a very large majority of states due to their
inherent potential for abuse by powerful states and the risks of
full-scale war their exercise might entail. 8 The United States in-
tervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, for example, was at
first justified as an exercise of the right to intervene to protect
nationals.10
Finally, it should be noted that article 103 of the United Nations
Charter expressly provides that the latter's provisions regarding
the obligations of members shall prevail over any conflicting provi-
sions contained in other international agreements.'
B. The OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty
The second body of norms relevant to foreign intervention and
OAS practice in this area is contained in the Charter of the OAS
(as amended) and in the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, or "Rio Treaty."
Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission to Iran and Its
Legality Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 512-13 (1981).
17 See, e.g., Riesman & McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in
HuMANITAIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNIrD NATIONS 167-95 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Fairley,
State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora's
Box, 10 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 29 (1980); Lillich, A United States Policy of Humanitarian
Intervention and Intercession, in HuMAN RIGHTS & AMER CAN FOREIGN POLICY 278, 287-92,
296-98 (D. Kommers & G. Loescher eds. 1979); R. Lillich & F. Newman, supra note 1, at
496-523.
"a The absence of any reference to these two claimed exceptions in the General Assem-
bly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 3, and its 1974 resolution, Defini-
tion of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Definition of Aggression], is extremely revealing in this connec-
tion. But see RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §703 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). The possible acceptability of an emer-
gency rescue operation to preserve Security Council jurisdiction is beyond the scope of the
present discussion.
" See Memorandum of the United States Department of State Legal Advisor (Legal basis
for United States actions in the Dominican Republic (May 7, 1965)), reprinted in 2 A.
CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 1179-82 (1969).
20 The precedence of U.N. Charter obligations over those obligations in the corresponding
regional treaties is expressly recognized in OAS Charter, supra note 3, art. 102, and Rio
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 10.
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The prohibitions against the use of force contained in the OAS
Charter are phrased in language that is even more categorical than
that of article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, reflecting the
long and painful history of the Latin American states, particularly
those in Central America and the Caribbean, which, through much
of the 19th century and the first third of the 20th century, were
subjected to repeated military intervention by the European pow-
ers and, particularly, the United States.2 Article 18 of the OAS
Charter establishes, for example:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or at-
tempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and social elements (emphasis added).
This prohibition against intervention, first adopted in 1933,11 is of
extreme importance to the Latin American states, particularly
Mexico, which suffered the humiliation of the American interven-
tion at Veracruz in 1914.5
Article 20 of the OAS Charter prohibits the use of force in the
most categorical of terms: "The territory of a state is inviolable; it
may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or
of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indi-
rectly, on any grounds whatever..." (emphasis added). Given the
recurrent reports of United States support for covert military ac-
tion against and within Nicaragua,24 it should perhaps be stressed
that articles 18 and 20 clearly prohibit any such covert
operations.25
21 See, e.g., F. GiL, LATIN AMERICAN-U.S. RELATONS 30-35, 64-116 (1971).
22 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, done Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 11, 49
Stat. 3097, T.S. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. See also Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Inter-
vention, done Dec. 23, 1936, art. 1, 51 Stat. 41, T.S. No. 923, 188 L.N.T.S. 31.
23 See F. Gn, supra note 21, at 110.
14 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 5; Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Wash-
ington Post, Mar. 14, 1982, at 1 col. 5.
" Such actions also violate U.N. CHART art. 2, para. 4; Rio Treaty, supra note 11, art. 1.
The latter provides: "The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in
their international relations not to resort to the threat or use of force in any manner incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this treaty." Id. The
scope of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has been clarified by the unanimous adoption of
two General Assembly resolutions. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 3;
Definition of Aggression, supra note 18, art. 3(f)-(g). Both contain language which explicitly
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The only exception to these comprehensive prohibitions is con-
tained in article 22, which establishes: "Measures adopted for the
maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing
treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in
Articles 18 and 20." Such measures include action taken pursuant
to any of the three exceptions to article 2(4) discussed above, as
well as diplomatic and economic sanctions to the extent, if any,
these are not considered "regional enforcement action" under arti-
cle 53(1). One final provision of the OAS Charter deserves men-
tion, as it has been used in the past to circumvent the clear
prohibitions of articles 18 and 20 without having to resort to the
machinery of the Rio Treaty in accordance with article 22. That
provision is article 59, which simply states that a meeting of for-
eign ministers may be held "in order to consider problems of an
urgent nature and of common interest to the American States
...." This provision was used in 1965 to justify the creation of an
Inter-American Force following United States intervention in the
Dominican Republic."' Legally, that action was in violation of arti-
cles 18, 20, and 22 of the OAS Charter, and was acquiesced to by
the Latin American states at least in part to gain some leverage
over the United States, which already had its troops in the Domin-
ican Republic.
The Rio Treaty provides in article 3 for collective self-defense in
the event of an armed attack against an American state, in which
case the parties undertake "to assist in meeting the attack in the
exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions." It should perhaps be noted in passing that the 1975 Proto-
col of Amendment to the Rio Treaty,"7 not yet in force,28 limits the
condemns the support of paramilitary operations against the territory of another state.
" See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
7 Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, July
26, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Protocol of Amendment to Rio Treaty], reprinted in 3 GEN-
ERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN TsATY OF RECIPRO-
CAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS, app. A (1977); 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, Tim INTzR-AMuCAN
SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS & OTHER DocuxNTs, PART II 359-72 (1983).
15 In accordance with the Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty, supra note 27, art.
VIII, the protocol will enter into force when two-thirds of the signatories have ratified the
agreement. Excluding Cuba, all 21 parties to the Rio Treaty have signed the protocol. To
date only seven have ratified: Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti,
Mexico, and the United States. The United States ratification was deposited on September
20, 1979. GENE.RAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN TREA-
TIEs AND CONVNTIONS 86 (Treaty Series No. 9 Rev. 1980).
[Vol. 13:385
UNDESIRABLE REGIME
application of article 3 to cases where a State Party, not merely an
American state, has been the victim of an armed attack.
It is interesting to note that, in the context of the Falklands cri-
sis, Argentina has argued that the language of article 3 requires its
Rio Treaty partners to render assistance in meeting the "armed
attack" represented by Great Britain's attempt to retake the is-
lands. 9 Given the obvious nexus between article 3 of the Rio
Treaty and article 51 of the United Nations Charter, it is clear that
Argentina's argument is untenable and would stand the Rio Treaty
on its head, converting it into a collective aggression treaty.3" It is
beyond doubt that the armed attack referred to in article 3 of the
Rio Treaty is an armed attack in violation of article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, and that the collective measures of self-
defense described in article 3 may be taken only in response to
such an attack. Instead of constituting an "armed attack" under
article 3, Great Britain's use of force is authorized under article 51
as a lawful response to Argentina's prior violation of article 2(4).1
Of particular significance in evaluating OAS practice regarding
foreign intervention is article 6 of the Rio Treaty, whose intricate
language merits particularly careful scrutiny. Article 6 provides:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an
extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other
fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree
on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to as-
sist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and for the main-
tenance of the peace and security of the Continent (emphasis
added).
In the past, this provision has been used by the signatories to au-
, See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1982, at 4, col. 1 (OAS Meeting of Consultation).
" See Rio Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3. Article 3(1) refers specifically to assistance "in
meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations." Article 3(4) refers exclusively to
"[m]easures of self-defense provided for under this Article." Cf. Definition of Aggression,
supra note 18, arts. 2-3.
"' The consequences of accepting Argentina's interpretation of the Rio Treaty would ex-
tend far beyond the South Atlantic. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mu-
tual Assistance, May 14, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (Warsaw Pact Treaty).
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thorize the adoption of collective economic sanctions such as an
arms embargo against the Dominican Republic in 1960,2 and the
arms embargo imposed against Cuba in January 1962. 3- During the
Cuban Missile Crisis, it was used to authorize the United States
naval blockade which was imposed to prevent the further importa-
tion of war material into the island, and even to authorize the use
of force to prevent the missiles in Cuba from becoming opera-
tional.14 In short, article 6 has been used to support the imposition
of OAS economic and even military sanctions against a signatory
in situations where no armed attack has occurred and consequently
no right to individual or collective self-defense exists under article
51 of the United Nations Charter."
Partially in response to such broad applications in the past, the
1975 Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance made a particularly significant change affecting
the text of article 6. A new article was added, providing as follows:
"Any assistance the Organ of Consultation may decide to furnish a
State Party may not be provided without the consent of that
State."3 6 Upon a close analysis, this provision must be read to ap-
ply not only to decisions of the Organ of Consultation that are
mandatory, but also to those that are recommendatory in nature.3
In other words, collective sanctions may no longer be imposed
under the authority of article 6 unless the OAS secures the consent
of the state concerned, at least in cases where the latter is the per-
ceived victim of outside subversion. If the 1975 Protocol of Amend-
ment had been in effect in January 1962, for example, the arms
embargo against Cuba could not have been imposed under article
6 without the latter's consent. While the new provision does not
remove all ambiguity from article 6, it does seem to prevent the
imposition of sanctions against a non-consenting state simply be-
" See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
" See 2 GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN
TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS 72-78 (3d. ed. 1973).
See 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at 1069-73.
" The use of military force has been authorized under article 6 only once, in the Cuban
Missile Crisis. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Military force was used by the
OAS in the Dominican Republic after the constitution of the Inter-American Force on May
23, 1965; however, this action was based not on article 6, but rather on a very liberal reading
of article 59 of the OAS Charter. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
s1 Protocol of Amendment to Rio Treaty, supra note 27, art. II. The revised version of
current article 6 will become article 5 once the protocol enters into force, while the provision
cited in the text will become new article 6. Id. arts. I-II.
37 See Jim~nez de Ar6chaga, International Law, supra note 14, at 141-42.
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cause the latter has adopted a Marxist orientation.
While the 1975 Protocol of Amendment has not yet received the
fourteen ratifications required for its entry into force, it has been
ratified by the United States and six other signatories.3 8 The
United States ratification is of particular significance since it may
be bound under the principles embodied in article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties "to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty" which has been
ratified but not yet entered into force. Participation in the imposi-
tion of collective sanctions under article 6 of the original Rio
Treaty under the conditions referred to above would apear to de-
feat the object and purpose of the 1975 Protocol, and thus may
constitute a violation of article 18 of the Vienna Convention. While
the United States has signed but not yet ratified the latter,"' arti-
cle 18 may still be binding if, as is very likely, it now represents
customary international law.
In any event, the adoption of military and perhaps economic
measures under the authority of article 6 does not dispense with
the necessity of securing the approval of any such regional enforce-
ment action by the Security Council. Such approval is required by
article 53(1) of the United Nations Charter and raises all of the
controversial questions referred to above.4"
It might be argued that the adoption of OAS economic or mili-
tary sanctions against a signatory state does not violate article
53(1) or article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, even when af-
firmative "approval" of such regional enforcement action by the
Security Council is not forthcoming, on the theory that the state
against which such collective measures are directed has granted its
"consent" to norms and procedures which otherwise would be in
violation of the prohibition of force contained in article 2(4).41
Such an argument lacks merit, however, due to the fact that under
the accepted international law doctrine of jus cogens (peremptory
law), there exist certain peremptory norms of international law
from which there can be no derogation by agreement between
" See supra note 28.
39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969),
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). The Convention entered into force on January
27, 1980, for those countries which had ratified it. L. HEINKN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H.
SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 580-81 (1980). See id. at 604.
40 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 9 (1963).
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states.42 Article 2(4) represents such a peremptory norm of inter-
national law, and consequently such consent cannot be invoked as
excepting- the actions in question from the basic prohibition of
force contained in article 2(4). The United States has espoused this
view most recently in arguing that even if the Afghanistan-
U.S.S.R. Treaty of Friendship of 1978 authorized Soviet interven-
tion (which it did not), such authorization would be void under
international law.43 With respect to the adoption of OAS economic
sanctions, which may not violate article 2(4), the real question is
whether they are included in the term "enforcement action" as
that term is used in article 53(1). If they are included, it is clear
that a state cannot waive its rights under article 53(1) by con-
senting to a regional agreement, for such an interpretation would
render article 53(1) nugatory. Obviously, this analysis also applies
in the case of military sanctions. In any event, whatever "consent"
the target state might give, it could not release other states from
their article 53(1) obligations. Nor could it overcome the express
language of article 103 of the Charter.
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNDESIRABLE REGIME: FOUR
CASES
Despite the legal framework outlined above, including, in partic-
ular, the clarity of the legal prohibitions against the use of force
across international frontiers, the United States has committed
grave violations of these fundamental legal norms on at least four
occasions since 1948. These cases are briefly summarized below.
A. Guatemala (1954)
In 1954 the United States government, acting through the CIA,
sponsored a paramilitary invasion of Guatemala aimed at over-
throwing the leftist government of Jacobo Arbenz." Armed bands
" See, e.g., A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, supra note 7, at 84-86, 262-67. The Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, has codified this principle in article 53. See also
id. arts. 64, 66; Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 535-38
(1970); NGUYEN Quoc DINH, P. DALLIER & A. PELLEr, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 190-97
(2d rev. ed. 1980).
3 Memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher from the Legal Adviser,
Roberts B. Owen (Dec. 29, 1979), reprinted in Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 418-20 (1980).
" See generally R. IMMERMAN, THE CIA IN GUATEMALA: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INTER-
VENTION (1982); S. SCHLESINGER & S. KINZER, BrrrER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1982). Interestingly, the United States considered possible
economic sanctions against Guatemala as early as 1949-1950. An apparent attempt to trans-
[Vol. 13:385
UNDESIRABLE REGIME
invaded the country on June 18, 1954."1 Guatemala took its case to
the Security Council on June 20. While the latter approved a reso-
lution calling for "the immediate termination of any action likely
to cause bloodshed" and for all United Nations members to ab-
stain from assisting any such action, the United States effort to
topple the Arbenz government pressed ahead. When Guatemala re-
newed its appeal to the Security Council on June 25, the United
States successfully blocked inscription of the complaint on the
agenda." On June 27, the Arbenz government fell in a military
coup by the Guatemalan army."'
B. Cuba: The Bay of Pigs (1961)
On April 17, 1961, approximately 1400 Cuban exiles, organized
and directed by the CIA, launched an amphibious invasion of Cuba
at the Bay of Pigs. Unlike the case in Guatemala, however, the
Cuban army remained loyal. Within two days the invaders were
surrounded by 20,000 troops and were forced to surrender. The op-
eration was a total fiasco. 48 On April 21, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly adopted a resolution calling on all parties to seek a
peaceful settlement in accordance with the Charter and "to abstain
from any action which may aggravate existing tensions. '49 During
the period following the collapse of the invasion, the United States
seriously considered moving directly against Cuba. The pressures
within the government for such military action were initially very
strong, but cooler heads prevailed. 50 Nonetheless, one consequence
of the initial invasion was closer military and economic cooperation
between Cuba and the Soviet Union. This attempt to repeat the
1954 success in toppling a leftist government may also have been
an important factor in the Soviet decision to install missiles in
Cuba in 1962,51 which led the world to the brink of nuclear war in
port arms to assist Guatemala's neighbors in an attempt to overthrow Arbenz was blocked
in 1952. R. IMMERMAN, supra, at 109-10, 118-22.
16 R. IMMERMAN, supra note 44, at 171-72. See generally C. BLASTER, THE HOVERING GIANT
151-77 (1976); W. KANE, CIVIL STRIFE IN LATIN AMERICA: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVE-
MENT 186-97 (1972); L. SOHN, UNITED NATIONS LAw 863-908 (1967) (Security Council
debates).
46 L. SOHN, supra note 45, at 877, 884, 907.
41 R. IMMERMAN, supra note 44, at 174.
48 See generally I. JASs, Vieinms oF GROUPTHINK 14-49 (1972); C. BLASIER, supra note 45,
at 177-202; P. WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY (1979).
49 M. ETzIONI, supra note 13, at 155-58; L. SOHN, supra note 45, at 938.
11 See C. BowLEs, PROMISES TO KEEP 326-31 (1971).
" See G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION 238-40 (1971).
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October of that year."
C. The Dominican Republic (1965)
On April 28, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered United
States marines to deploy in the Dominican Republic in order to
prevent the consolidation of a revolutionary movement begun four
days earlier, and which had as its stated objective the restoration
to power of the democratically-elected government of Juan Bosch,
who had been deposed by a military coup in September, 1963." At
the time of the United States intervention, military forces opposed
to the revolutionary or "constitutionalist" faction were in disarray,
and a complete constitutionalist victory appeared imminent."
United States officials, however, viewed the constitutionalist fac-
tion as infiltrated by, or subject to, the potential influence of com-
munist or "Castroite" elements. Consequently, President Johnson
ordered United States forces to intervene in order to avoid the
possibility of a communist takeover." In an operation foreshad-
owing the Kabul airlift of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979,
some 23,000 troops were landed in the Dominican Republic, mostly
by air, within the next two weeks."
While the OAS was persuaded, over the vociferous opposition of
most of its democratic members, to adopt a resolution on May 6
establishing an Inter-American Force (IAF) to be made up of cont-
ingents from member countries, the force was not constituted until
May 23, and United States forces on the island remained under
United States command until the Brazilian commander of the IAF
arrived on May 29.'5 In the interim, United States forces moved on
May 3-with the assent of a special OAS Committee on the
scene-to open a military corridor which linked the United States
forces near the embassies with those being flown into the San
" See generally A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MlssnE CRIsIs (1974).
63 See generally A. LOWENTHAL, THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION (1972); J. SLATER, INTER-
VENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION (1970).
A. LOWENTHAL, supra note 53, at 96-104; J. SLATER, supra note 53, at 29, 31, 42n., 44;
Slater, The Dominican Republic, 1961-66, in FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A
POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 307 (B. Blechman & S. Kaplan eds. 1978).
" Slater, supra note 54, at 310-11; A. LOWENTHAL, supra note 53, at 116, 137-39; J.
SLATER, supra note 54, at 31.
" A. LOWENTHAL, supra note 53, at 110-12; Slater, supra note 54, at 315.
57 See 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at 1172-77; 4 Organiza-
ci6n de los Estados Americanos (OAS), Dbcima Reuni6n de Consulta de Ministros de Rela-
ciones Exteriores, Actas y Documentos, OAS Doc. OEA/SER. F/III. 10 at 21-23 (1968) [her-
inafter cited as D~cima Reuni6n de Consulta].
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Isidro Air Base outside of town. Perhaps not coincidentally, this
air base was the headquarters of a military junta formed at the
United States' suggestion and opposed to the "constitutionalist"
forces. The latter were cut in two by the May 3 operation, which
cut off the strongest of the two components with their backs to the
sea.58 Beginning on May 13 and 14, United States troops allowed
the junta's forces to cross its lines and attack the constitutional-
ists.59 A week of bitter fighting ensued, and a ceasefire was not es-
tablished until May 22.
An important aspect of the Dominican crisis was that the United
Nations Security Council became actively involved, for the first
time, in dealing with a conflict which the OAS itself was simultane-
ously seeking to resolve. The Council passed a ceasefire resolution
on May 14, sent a representative of the Secretary General to the
Dominican Republic, and contributed directly to the establishment
of a permanent ceasefire.' 0 This ceasefire was finally achieved on
May 22 in response to both a Security Council resolution of that
date and similar calls by the OAS in the preceding days. The
United Nations action exerted considerable pressure on the OAS,
which finally moved on May 22 to actually set up a unified com-
mand for the Inter-American Force."1
On June 2, the IAF was renamed the Inter-American Peace
Force (IAPF) and placed under the supervision of a special three-
member committee of the OAS which was in fact dominated by the
United States member, Ellsworth Bunker.6" This committee,
backed by the IAPF, secured the establishment of a provisional
government on September 3 and free elections on June 1, 1966.
Joaquin Balaguer was the winner, and the last contingent of the
IAPF withdrew in September 1966.63
D. Legal Aspects of the Preceding Cases
Both the Guatemalan and Cuban paramilitary invasions consti-
tuted violations by the United States of article 2(4) of the United
A. LOWENTHAL, supra note 53, at 127-31, 139; J. SLATER, supra note 53, at 44, 82-83.
See 4 Decima Reunion de Consulta, supra note 57, at 204; J. SLATER, supra note 53, at 61-
66.
6 See Slater, supra note 54, at 320, 322-23, 339; J. SLATER, supra note 53, at 55-57, 204.
o See generally L. SOHN, supra note 45, at 1025-72.
01 See id. at 1054-55; 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENPELD, supra note 19, at 1208-
14; 2 Dcima Reuni6n de Consulta, supra note 57, at 169-329.
01 Id. at 333-47. See Slater, supra note 54, at 331-32.
'3 See Slater, supra note 54, at 325-31.
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Nations Charter, articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter, and article
1 of the Rio Treaty. These are the fundamental provisions prohib-
iting the use of force across international frontiers upon which
both the United Nations and OAS are founded. The 1965 interven-
tion in the Dominican Republic was justified at first as interven-
tion to protect nationals and other foreigners." ' This, however, was
not the true reason for the intervention of 23,000 United States
troops, and the justification was in fact all but abandoned within a
few days after the initial deployment of troops."5 Even if the inter-
vention had been limited to the protection of nationals and other
foreigners, moreover, it would still have constituted a violation of
the provisions referred to above.""
Two other legal aspects of the Dominican intervention are worth
noting. First, the IAF was established by a Meeting of Foreign
Ministers under article 59 of the OAS Charter, using an "implied
powers" rationale. 7 Such action, however, directly violated the
specific prohibitions contained in articles 18, 20, and 22 of the OAS
Charter, undercutting the argument that such action was author-
ized by "implied powers" contained in that instrument. Second,
the use of military force by the OAS without the consent of the
legally-constituted government of the Dominican Republic 8 (or
even both factions in the conflict)69 clearly constituted enforce-
ment action within the meaning of article 53(1) of the United Na-
tions Charter. Though the question of whether enforcement action
includes economic sanctions remains unanswered, the use of mili-
tary force clearly does constitute such action. This point was force-
fully made in the Security Council debates and, while not resolved
by votes on various resolutions, certainly influenced the readiness
of a number of governments to support direct United Nations in-
See 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at 1161 (Statement of
President Johnson, April 28, 1965).
66 See id. at 1168-70; see also supra note 19.
" See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
67 See Resolution of May 6, 1965, reprinted in 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD,
supra note 19, at 1175-77.
" See, e.g., L. SOHN, supra note 45, at 1068 (Statement of Uruguayan representative in
Security Council debates).
'9 Constitutionalist President Francisco Caamahio Deft6, in a letter of May 10 to the
Meeting of Consultation, offered to accept an OAS force as soon as his government was
recognized by the members of the OAS. The offer, however, was never accepted. 2 D6cima
Reuni6n de Consulta, supra note 57, at 180-83; 4 id. at 466-68. Indeed, in July, 1965, both
factions were calling for the withdrawal of the IAPF. See J. SLATER, supra note 53, at 117-
18; and Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World
Order (Pt. 2), 44 DEN. L.J. 225, 266 (1967).
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volvement in resolution of the dispute.
Finally, it should be noted that the OAS established the IAF by
a bare two-thirds majoirty vote, including the vote of the junta's
representative which was of highly questionable validity. It did not
receive the support of most of the democratic members of the
organization. 7°
E. Nicaragua (1981 to the present)
Given reliable press reports that the United States has organ-
ized, financed, and coordinated paramilitary forces operating in
Honduras and engaging in armed incursions into Nicaragua,
7 it
appears that a situation is developing which is in many ways com-
parable to the United States-sponsored overthrow of the Arbenz
regime in Guatemala in 1954 and the rather less successful 1961
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. At the same time, the United States
has charged that Nicaragua supports the guerrillas operating in El
Salvador. These developments signal a new and extemely grave cri-
sis for the Organization of American States.
If Nicaragua has or is presently engaged in supplying significant
quantities of arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas, its action violates
article 18 of the OAS Charter. The appropriate response would be
the convocation of a Meeting of Consultation under the Rio
Treaty, first, to determine whether Nicaragua is indeed intervening
in the internal affairs of El Salvador by supporting the guerrilla
movement with arms and, second, to take appropriate action under
article 6 of the Treaty. A Meeting of Consultation could assess the
accuracy of the United States charges, encourage Nicaragua to
cease any violation of article 18, and perhaps, should Nicaragua
fail to comply with the Charter, impose economic sanctions under
the authority of article 6 until such violations cease. Recourse to
the appropriate procedures under the Rio Treaty is the proper way
for the United States and El Salvador to deal with any Nicaraguan
violation of article 18, and is also legally required by articles 2 and
6 of the Rio Treaty.72 The United States failure to pursue this
course of action suggests an inability to muster sufficient support
70 See 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at 1175-77.
"' See supra note 24. For more recent accounts, see A Secret War in Nicaragua, NEws-
WEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42-53; Washington Post, Apr. 17, 1983, at 1, col. 4 (comprehensive
overview of U.S. decision-making and involvement).
72 See OAS Charter, supra note 3, arts. 23-28; Rio Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 1-2, 6. See
also U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33, 37.
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from parties to the Rio Treaty, possible weakness in the factual
basis of United States claims regarding Nicaraguan arms ship-
ments to El Salvador, and perhaps a reluctance to raise issues con-
cerning "enforcement action" in the Security Council, where voting
majorities are no longer as sympathetic as in the past.
Even if Nicaragua is guilty of shipping arms to El Salvador,
neither the United States nor Honduras may legally organize and
support the sending of armed paramilitary forces into Nicaragua.
The only possible justification for such action would be if the Nica-
raguan assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas were so serious as to
constitute an "armed attack".73 Even then, however, El Salvador
would have to request collective assistance under article 3 of the
Rio Treaty, and all measures of collective self-defense would have
to be reported immediately to the Security Council under the
terms of article 5 of the Rio Treaty and article 51 of the United
Nations Charter.7 ' More importantly, the actions taken would have
to meet the strict requirements of necessity and proportionality
which are an integral part of the right of self-defense. 7 As far as is
known, however, these steps have not been taken, while the evi-
dence remains unpersuasive that Nicaraguan support of the Salva-
doran guerrillas rises to the level of an "armed attack. '7 6 Conse-
quently, whatever actions may be in progress against and within
the territory of Nicaragua cannot be justified as an exercise of the
right of collective self-defense.
What appears far more likely than the existence of an "armed
attack" by Nicaragua against El Salvador is that the United
States, Honduras, and perhaps other countries actively support
paramilitary forces who have launched or are launching armed at-
tacks against Nicaragua in an effort to destabilize or overthrow the
Sandinista regime. 7 As it is the use of force, not the objective,
which is prohibited by international law, such paramilitary action
constitutes, in any event, a violation of the fundamental legal
norms referred to above.
73 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
71 See Rio Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 3(2), 5; U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
75 See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 261-64,
278-79, 434 (1964).
76 See id. at 278-79. Cf. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 3, paras. 8-9 (Prin-
ciple Prohibiting Threat or Use of Force); Definition of Aggression, supra note 18, art. 3(g).
Regarding the evidence of Nicaraguan involvement, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at 1,
col. 1; id. Mar. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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While United States presidents have in the past attempted to
draw a distinction between the direct use of United States military
force to overthrow a government and the use of foreign paramili-
tary forces to achieve the same objective,7 8 such a distinction finds
little support in international law.79 Domestically, everyone knows
that if an individual hires someone to kill an enemy, it is not
merely the one who pulls the trigger who is legally responsible for
murder. Somehow, on the international level, the analogous point
does not seem always to be grasped by United States policymakers.
There exists, moreover, the risk or possibility that United States
forces might become directly engaged in military action against
Nicaragua. An attempt to justify such action could, for example, be
based on a claim that Nicaragua had launched an armed attack
against Honduras and that the United States was responding to a
request from Honduras to act in exercise of the right of collective
self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Such a
claim, of course, would be met with immense skepticism in view of
apparent United States and Honduran support of armed attacks
against Nicaraguan territory launched from Honduras. Such action
would involve the Security Council at the earliest moment, and al-
legations concerning the facts of any Nicaraguan attack would be
subjected to the most intense scrutiny. Furthermore, the United
States would be legally required to invoke the machinery of the
Rio Treaty and also report its actions directly to the Security
Council. Finally, it should be recalled that the right of self-defense
is strictly limited by the requirements of necessity to repel the at-
tack and proportionality in the measures undertaken to achieve
this objective. Consequently, even minor border crossings or artil-
lery exchanges, for example, could not be used by Honduras and
the United States to undertake major military actions against Nic-
aragua without violating these twin requirements. Given the at-
tacks against Nicaragua which have occurred, any objective ob-
server would be far more likely to conclude that the Nicaraguan
actions themselves were taken in exercise of the right of self-
defense.
In any event, as was clear in both the Guatamalan and the Bay
of Pigs cases, such support of armed paramilitary attacks against
Nicaragua constitutes a flagrant violation of article 2(4) of the
78 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying 'text.
79 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4); OAS Charter, supra note 3, arts. 18, 20; see also supra
notes 25 and 76.
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United Nations Charter and articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Char-
ter.80 Significantly, this means that Cuban or Soviet forces might
be legally justified in coming to the defense of Nicaragua in exer-
cise of the right of collective self-defense under article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. Such action, of course, could take the
world to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. Were such a devel-
opment to occur, moreover, the blatant illegality of United States
actions would deprive the country of the type of support it re-
ceived in the OAS, the United Nations, and from individual gov-
ernments during the Cuban Missile crisis."1
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Dilemma of the Undesirable Regime
Two basic dilemmas were noted at the beginning of this article.
The first dilemma results from the fact that strict adherence to the
legal principles prohibiting the use of force across international
frontiers and other forms of intervention may lead to the accession
to or maintenance in power of regimes which are undersirable
(whether because they are Marxist, guilty of gross violations of
fundamental human rights, or both). As manifested in a case in-
volving the first type of regime, the dilemma is not really in but
rather of international law. Dilemmas in international law (such as
the proper interpretation of article 53(1) of the United Nations
Charter, whether forcible intervention to protect nationals violates
article 2(4), or the permissible breadth of interpretation which can
be given to article 59 of the OAS Charter) have been mentioned
above. Here, however, one is dealing with a dilemma of a different
sort, a dilemma of international law itself. This is a dilemma of law
observance, of whether to follow international law, or to violate its
most basic prohibitions in order to overthrow or block the acces-
sion to power of a government which is, or is perceived to be,
Marxist. As we have seen, the United States has chosen the latter
course in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic
(1965), and now apparently in Nicaragua as well. The more indi-
rect intervention of the United States in Chile, in attempting to
block the accession to power of Salvador Allende in 1970, should
also be noted."'
s0 See supra note 79.
8' Regarding the support received in 1962, see A. CHAYES, supra note 52, at 74-85.




As manifested in a case involving the second type of regime, the
dilemma is whether to violate fundamental legal norms in order to
halt massive violations of the most basic human rights, or to ob-
serve international law with the potential result that such abuses
will continue unabated. 83 In several cases which fall into this cate-
gory, the decision has been to violate these norms. The United
States openly threatened to use force, and with the OAS used stiff
economic sanctions in pressuring the Dominican Republic to liber-
alize its government during 1960-62. 84 In the Nicaraguan civil war
of 1978-79, a number of countries actively supported the
Sandinista rebels in order to bring down the Somoza regime.8 5
Whichever form it takes, therefore, the dilemma of the undesir-
able regime remains. Should states act in ways which strengthen
and support the fundamental legal norms of the international sys-
tem, or act in ways which, however successful in achieving immedi-
ate objectives, weaken the legal norms and institutions upon which
international peace and security ultimately depend?
B. The Dilemma of Inaction and Eventual War
The second dilemma mentioned in the Introduction results from
the fact that inaction may permit human rights abuses and inter-
nal strife to .develop in ways which either invite military interven-
tion by foreign powers or embolden domestic leaders, disdainful of
international law, to launch aggressive wars.8 Military interven-
tion to avoid these evils, however, may lead other powers to inter-
vene and to the risk of major war. Whatever the choice, interna-
tional conflict may well result. Nevertheless, there are cogent
reasons why military intervention, even in this type of situation,
should be avoided. First, it is of great importance who commits the
first illegal use of force, both in terms of the need for consistent
national policies in support of article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, and in terms of a state's ability to mobilize collective re-
sponses aimed at restoring international peace and security. Sec-
ond, these are situations in which chapters VI and VII of the Char-
s8 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Slater, supra note 54, at 290-300.
In 1979, this assistance reached an extraordinary level. Booth reports, for example, that
from May to July, 1979, Costa Rican civilian transport planes made 21 flights from Havana
to Liberia, a city in northern Costa Rica, funneling a total of some 320 tons of arms to the
FSLN in Nicaragua. J. BOOTH, THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION
152 (1982).
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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ter authorize the Security Council to act.s8 The unilateral use of
force in such circumstances will inevitably reduce the Security
Council's ability to deal effectively with problems of this type, a
development which can hardly be accepted without abandoning
Security Council effectiveness as a goal. Third, states retain a great
ability to characterize and distort facts in any given situation, and
to permit such action would open further the doors leading to ag-
gressive military actions cloaked in the best of expressed inten-
tions. Finally, even if the risk of eventual international conflict is
great, war may always be avoided at the last minute, whether
through effective recourse to the Security Council or through the
application of strong bilateral pressures by a number of govern-
ments. The foregoing arguments are of a practical nature. Legally,
it is clear that such unilateral military intervention violates article
2(4) of the Charter."8
In both of the preceding dilemmas, therefore, the ultimate ques-
tion is whether states should act so as to observe and support in-
ternational law and its most basic norms. To put the matter differ-
ently, can an international legal order be constructed through
policies and actions which violate its most basic precepts?
C. Suggested Responses
1. Strengthening International Machinery for the Protection
of Human Rights
As suggested in the Introduction, there remains much that can
be done to ease the two dilemmas discussed above. If, at a given
point of choice,89 the decision may be the stark one of law obser-
vance or law violation, there are nonetheless steps that can be
taken in the meantime to provide additional legal alternatives
which may reduce the temptation to resort to force. The most
promising measures that might be taken appear to be those which
would strengthen international legal machinery for the protection
of human rights. The routine acceptance of on-site investigations
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-51.
See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
89 For a provocative analysis of how international law is relevant to such decisions, see R.
FISHER, POINTS OF CHOICE (1978). See also R. FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1981). The reference in the text, however, should not be read to mean that
questions of international law can be reduced to a single decision. Rather, international law
can best be viewed as influencing numerous perceptions and actions within a continuous
flow of events and decisions. See, e.g., A. CHAYES, supra note 52, at 100-05.
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by bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, for example, would help to limit abuses by keeping govern-
ments accountable for their actions.90 Similarly, the existence of
compulsory jurisdiction before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in individual cases, as well as the admissibility of
state party complaints, would provide legal avenues for reducing
internal conflict, thereby diminishing the temptation of outside
powers to intervene with force. Had the United States taken the
lead in ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights and
accepting the optional clauses, legal mechanisms might now exist
which would permit it to effectively pursue its claims of human
rights violations by the government of Nicaragua.9"
The effective use of human rights machinery, moreover, can have
quite a significant impact on many governments. Publicization of
widespread abuses may be highly embarrassing to a nation's lead-
ers, and help to mobilize both internal and external forces which
can induce governments to take human rights seriously. Among the
most significant impacts produced by the actions of official bodies
such as the IACHR, for example, is a shift in the level of decision-
making from the local precinct station or army barracks to the for-
eign minister, the cabinet, and the president of the country in-
volved. Moreover, domestic leaders are induced to realize that in-
ternational law can produce strong negative effects, both internally
and internationally, especially when nations seek loans, trade,
technology and other benefits. That realization may nurture a
healthier respect for provisions such as article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter.
2. United States Intervention in Nicaragua: The Critical
Choices
As "covert" military action organized and supported by the
United States apparently continues against and within the terri-
tory of Nicaragua, government officials, Congressmen and Sena-
tors, and individual citizens face a number of critical choices. A
few of these may be briefly mentioned here. The first and perhaps
the most important is the basic choice as to the role that the
" See Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, 15 TEx. INT'L L.J. at 46-95 (1980); T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS
& D. SHELTON, supra note 1, at 149-65.
9, See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 45, 62, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1/Rev.1/Corr.1, Doc. 65 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970).
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United States is to play in the world community: whether it will
pursue actions designed to strengthen international law and orga-
nizations, or act as an international outlaw which openly flouts the
fundamental norms prohibiting the threat or use of force across
international frontiers upon which not only the postwar legal order
but also the very concept of international order itself depends.
Open violations of these norms by a superpower do considerably
more damage to the international order than do similar violations
by smaller and less important states. Violations by the United
States may do the most harm of all, for something more is ex-
pected of this country than of the Soviet Union. The United States
is a leader of other nations, and its example will surely be followed.
The most important choice, therefore, is whether the United States
will continue efforts to construct a viable international legal order
in which the use of force is reduced to a minimum (a process in
which the United States has played a leading role in the past,
whether in pushing for the creation of the League of Nations, in
sponsoring the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, or in
building the United Nations on a Charter whose cornerstone is the
prohibition of the threat or use of force). Or will the United States
abandon this effort, and seek to ensure its own security primarily
by reliance on military force?
Related to the first is a second choice: Will the United States
proceed by its actions against Nicaragua to establish a dangerous
precedent which would lower the costs to others of violating Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter? Such a harmful precedent
would weaken the ability of the United States to mobilize its allies
and others to join in collective responses against the Soviet Union
should it invade Poland or Iran, would dilute the effect of pres-
sures for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and, generally,
would reduce the broad range of political and other costs to the
Soviet Union, particularly among the developing and smaller coun-
tries, for engaging in illegal military action. Such a precedent
would also weaken the ability of the United States to influence its
allies. It might, for example, have the effect of encouraging Vene-
zuela to seize territory from Guiana which it claims, or of tempting
Argentina to resume the Falklands conflict or settle the Beagle
Channel Islands dispute with Chile by resort to force, including in
the future, perhaps, the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, such a
precedent would be hard to distinguish from Somali support of
rebels in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Libyan support of rebels
in northern Chad, or even potential Cuban support of paramilitary
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exile forces attempting to invade and overthrow the government of
Haiti. 2 The issue, therefore, is whether the superpower most
closely identified with the struggle for effective international law
and institutions will act in ways which weaken restraints against
actions such as those described above.9s Or will the United States
act in a manner which establishes the sort of precedent which
would not harm United States interests if it were to be followed by
other nations?
A third choice is also closely related to those above. Which way
do we wish students and future leaders in the Third World to look,
East or West? For every Nicaraguan soldier killed, United States-
92 Assistance provided by outside countries to Afghan rebels following the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979 can be distiguished from the cases cited in the text, as it is closely
analogous to, if indeed it does not constitute, assistance provided in exercise of the right of
collective self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. To the extent such assistance is
necessary and proportionate to the need to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, it can best be viewed as consistent with Article 51 and thus not in violation of
Article 2(4) of the Charter. The reporting requirement of Article 51 should be complied
with, but even if it is not, such a failure, in a situation where a country has been invaded
and had its government overthrown by foreign troops, would not seem to constitute a seri-
ous violation of the basic norms of the Charter.
*a United States support of covert operations in Nicaragua also raises the issue of whether
the United States government will observe the requirements of domestic law. In December,
1982 the so-called Boland Amendment became law as part of a continuing appropriations
act for 1983. It provides:
None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military training or advice, or
other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a
country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nica-
ragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.
P.L. 97-377 §793; 96 Stat. 1865. Moreover, the Neutrality Act establishes the following:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or impris-
oned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. §960 (1976). See Note, Non-Enforcement of the Neutrality Act: International
Law and Foreign Policy Powers Under the Constitution, 95 HARD. L. REV. 1955 (1982).
Both of the foregoing provisions of the United States domestic law must be interpreted in
a way which is consistent with international law, including treaties to which the United
States is a party. This means that any ambiguity in the language of either provision must be
interpreted so as to be consistent with art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and arts. 18 and 20 of
the OAS Charter. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "[A]n act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See RESTATE-
MENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §134 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 3(1) and comment j (1965).
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supported military intervention or direct United States military
action against Nicaragua may create hundreds of hard-line Marxist
recruits in not only Central America but also Mexico, the Carib-
bean, South America, and countries in other parts of the world.
This choice brings us back, perhaps, to the first, and may be put as
follows: What is the essence of the American character, today, and
what, in fact, does the United States stand for? Individual Ameri-
cans will ask this question of themselves, but it will also be asked
by influential citizens in developing and other countries. The coop-
eration of the latter will be required to meet common challenges in
a broad range of international "games" or arenas in the future.
In shaping or responding to United States policies and actions
toward Nicaragua, therefore, individuals in the United States and
other countries will have to ask what their own country stands for,
and what role it should play not only in dealing with an "undesir-
able" regime, but also in constructing a viable international order
based on the legal prohibition of the threat or use of force.
[Vol. 13:385
